Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at Sentencing by Paciocco, Palma
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
10-2014 
Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and 
Prosecutors at Sentencing 
Palma Paciocco 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ppaciocco@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Criminal Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Judges Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Paciocco, Palma. "Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at Sentencing." 
Canadian Criminal Law Review, vol. 81, no. 3, 2014, pp. 241-268. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of
Judges and Prosecutors at Sentencing
Palma Paciocco*
The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that prosecutors are not constitu-
tionally obligated to consider the principle of proportionality when exercising their
discretion in a manner that narrows the range of available sentences: since only
judges are responsible for sentencing, they alone are constitutionally required to
ensure proportionality. When mandatory minimum sentences apply, however,
judges have limited sentencing discretion and may be unable to achieve propor-
tionality. If the Court takes the principle of proportionality seriously, and if it in-
sists that only judges are constitutionally bound to enforce that principle, it must
therefore create new tools whereby judges can avoid imposing disproportionate
mandatory minimums. Its best avenue for doing so is to reconceive of the s. 12
Charter standard for cruel and unusual punishment as it applies to mandatory
minimums. Furthermore, although prosecutors are not constitutionally obligated to
consider proportionality when exercising their discretion, they are ethically bound
to do so.
La Cour suprême du Canada a récemment statué que les procureurs ne sont
pas constitutionnellement obligés de tenir compte du principe de proportionnalité
lors de l’exercice de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire d’une manière qui réduit
l’éventail des peines proposées. Étant donné que seuls les juges sont responsables
de la détermination de la peine, eux seuls sont constitutionnellement tenus de
garantir la proportionnalité. Toutefois, lorsque des peines minimales obligatoires
s’appliquent, les juges ont un pouvoir discrétionnaire limité à l’égard de la déter-
* Of the Bar of Ontario and the New York State Bar. The ideas expressed in this article
were developed in part through my participation as a presenter at the International
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law’s Young Justice Professionals Program, held
on June 24, 2014 in Vancouver. I am grateful to the conference organizers, especially
the Honourable Justice Elizabeth A. Bennett and the Honourable Justice Gregory J.
Fitch, for inviting me to participate as a presenter; to the program participants; and,
especially, to my co-presenters, M. Joyce DeWitt-Van Oosten Q.C. and Elizabeth T.
W. France, with whom I enjoyed fruitful conversations about R. v. Anderson and
prosecutorial discretion. The opinions expressed herein (and, of course, any errors) are
mine alone. I am also grateful to the editors of this journal, especially Justice Patrick
Healy, for insightful comments on an earlier draft; to Jeremy Opolsky for generous and
helpful feedback; and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doc-
toral Fellowship program for funding support. This article, including the postscript,
states the law as of October 1, 2014.
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mination de la peine et peuvent être dans l’impossibilité de respecter le principe de
proportionnalité. Si la Cour prend le principe de proportionnalité au sérieux, et si
elle insiste sur le fait que seuls les juges sont constitutionnellement tenus
d’appliquer ce principe, elle doit donc créer de nouveaux outils permettant aux
juges d’éviter d’imposer des peines minimales obligatoires disproportionnées. La
meilleure façon d’y parvenir est de repenser l’article 12 de la Charte canadienne
des droits et libertés à l’égard des châtiments cruels et inusités, comme il
s’applique aux peines minimales obligatoires. De plus, bien que les procureurs ne
sont pas constitutionnellement obligés de tenir compte de la proportionnalité dans
l’exercice de leur pouvoir discrétionnaire, ils sont tenus de s’y plier d’un point de
vue éthique.
1. INTRODUCTION
Our criminal justice system is increasingly characterized by mandatory mini-
mum sentences.1 Mandatory minimums prohibit judges from handing down
sentences that fall below a predetermined floor, even if those sentences would oth-
erwise be called for by competing rules and principles. The competing rules and
principles include, most notably, the principle of proportionality.2 That principle,
which is discussed in detail below and is enshrined in the Criminal Code, stipulates
that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to” — that is, calibrated to reflect — “the
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”3 By pre-
cluding certain sentences, mandatory minimums limit judicial discretion at the sen-
tencing phase. At the same time, they increase the scope and significance of
prosecutorial discretion because they are activated by prosecutors’ decisions. Pros-
ecutors can trigger mandatory minimums by charging crimes that carry those
sentences; by proving certain aggravating factors at sentencing; by refusing to ac-
1 While it is still the case, as the Supreme Court noted in 2000, that “[m]andatory mini-
mum sentences are not the norm in this country,” (R. v. W. (L.W.), 2000 SCC 18,
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, 143 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 2000 CarswellBC 750, 2000 CarswellBC
749, 32 C.R. (5th) 58 at para.18 [“Wust”]), they are becoming increasingly prevalent.
Writing in 2012, Debra Parkes observed that “the number of mandatory sentences ap-
proaches 100,” adding that “[t]here are other ways to count that would yield a higher or
lower number, but the key point is that we have witnessed a rapid proliferation of
mandatory sentences, beginning in 1996 and escalating from 2006-present.” Debra
Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory
Sentences” (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149, 150 & note 4 [“Parkes”]. That number has
since risen, and there are currently new bills before Parliament that would further in-
crease both the number and the severity of mandatory minimum sentences in Canada.
See infra note 40. See also Benjamin L. Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Polit-
ics of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” (2009), 47
S.C.L.R. (2d) 101, 105-06 [“Berger”].
2 Justice Arbour, writing for a unanimous Court in Wust, supra note 1 at para.18, re-
marked: “Mandatory minimum sentences [. . .] depart from the general principles of
sentencing expressed in the [Criminal] Code, in the case law, and in the literature on
sentencing. In particular, they often detract from what Parliament has expressed as the
fundamental principle of sentencing in s. 718.1 of the [Criminal] Code: the principle of
proportionality.”
3 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.1 [“Criminal Code”].
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cept guilty pleas to lesser offences that do not carry mandatory minimums; or by
electing to proceed summarily or by indictment where that election entails a partic-
ular mandatory minimum. In short, the prosecutor’s charging decisions — as op-
posed to the judge’s proportionality analysis — can largely determine the of-
fender’s sentence.
Claimants who wish to challenge the constitutionality of mandatory minimum
sentences have traditionally done so via s. 12 of the Charter, which prohibits cruel
and unusual punishment or treatment.4 Their claims have, however, been met with
only modest success because Supreme Court case law sets a very high bar for s. 12
claims. Among other things, the Court has insisted that only grossly disproportion-
ate sentences contravene s. 12; “mere” disproportionality is not enough to ground a
claim.5 It is in fact so difficult for claimants to challenge mandatory minimums
under s. 12, commentators describe that Charter provision as a “dead end” and a
“‘faint hope’ guarantee of sorts.”6
Faced with the s. 12 “dead end” and burdened by harsh sentences resulting
from mandatory minimums, claimants have begun looking for new ways to frame
their cases. In the recent case of R. v. Anderson, the claimant — who faced a
mandatory minimum sentence for an impaired driving offence — did not rely on s.
12 of the Charter at all.7 Instead, he contended the prosecutor’s discretionary deci-
sion to invoke the Criminal Code provision that triggered the mandatory minimum
sentence in his case was unconstitutional under s. 7 of the Charter, because that
decision did not give due consideration to the claimant’s status as an Aboriginal
offender.8 The claimant also sought a judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision
on non-Charter grounds. A unanimous Supreme Court rejected both arguments and
applied the mandatory minimum sentence.
Arguably, the Court’s Anderson decision does not change much of anything. It
clarifies, but does not substantially revise, the law on the judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion. It signals that Charter challenges to mandatory minimum
sentences should continue to be brought via s. 12 claims; and since s. 12 was not
litigated in Anderson, the decision does not directly affect the law in that area at all.
The Court declined the invitation to recognize a new s. 7 principle of fundamental
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 12, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [“Charter”].
5 “The test for review under s. 12 of the Charter is one of gross disproportionality, be-
cause it is aimed at punishments that are more than merely excessive.” R. v. Smith,
1987 CarswellBC 198, 1987 CarswellBC 704, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 58 C.R. (3d) 193,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1072 [“Smith”].
6 Marie-Eve Sylvestre, “The (Re)Discovery of the Proportionality Principle in Sentenc-
ing in Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of Collective Responsibility”
(2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 461, 466 [“Sylvestre”]; Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punish-
ment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 554, 583
[“Cameron”].
7 R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, 11 C.R. (7th) 1, 2014 CSC 41, 2014 CarswellNfld 167,
2014 CarswellNfld 166 at para. 35 (S.C.C.) [“Anderson, S.C.C”].
8 Section 7 states, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice.” Charter, supra note 4.
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justice that could underpin an alternative Charter claim, and it did not otherwise
impose new obligations on prosecutors. To the contrary, it extended its trend of
affording substantial deference to prosecutors and to Parliament in the area of crim-
inal sentencing policy. Yet, the decision is noteworthy precisely because it does so
little to advance the law on mandatory minimum sentences, even as the facts in
Anderson illustrate that this area of the law is increasingly insensitive to the reali-
ties of our contemporary criminal justice system.
As we will see, the Court’s Anderson analysis is grounded in its understanding
of judges’ and prosecutors’ distinct roles: judges sentence, prosecutors do not;
hence only the former can be obliged to apply sentencing principles like the princi-
ple of proportionality. In what follows, I will argue that there is, in fact, a striking
disconnect between this account and the actual practice of criminal sentencing.
Quite simply, when mandatory minimums apply, judges cannot ensure proportion-
ality. More precisely, they cannot ensure proportionality unless they are empow-
ered to evade mandatory minimums that would obligate them to impose dispropor-
tionate sentences. At present, judges are not so empowered, thanks in large part to
the Court’s parsimonious s. 12 jurisprudence. Anderson has not provided the an-
swer to this conundrum, but it has underlined the question: how might the Court
give judges the tools they need to ensure proportionate sentences in the face of
mandatory minimums? This article addresses that question by offering two non-
mutually exclusive recommendations about how the principle of proportionality
can be better respected in a criminal justice system that is increasingly character-
ized by mandatory minimum sentences. The first bears on the obligations of prose-
cutors, while the second relates to the role of judges in upholding the Charter.
The article proceeds as follows: sections 2 and 3 sketch out the current state of
the law by analyzing the recent Anderson decision, focusing on that decision’s im-
plications for the future of the proportionality principle under the Charter; section 2
offers a brief summary of the decision, which readers familiar with Anderson may
wish to skip; and section 3 considers the separate roles of judges and prosecutors in
the context of mandatory minimum sentences, both as envisaged by the Anderson
Court and as those roles play out in reality. I find a disconnect here. Per Anderson,
judges have the sole constitutional responsibility to ensure proportionate sentences.
Yet, as the facts in Anderson illustrate, judges are sometimes incapable of discharg-
ing this responsibility in practice due to mandatory minimums. I conclude that, if
the Court takes the principle of proportionality seriously, as it should, then it needs
to fashion new tools whereby judges can avoid applying disproportionate
mandatory minimum sentences. The balance of the article suggests how we might
design such tools.
Section 4 identifies a way of promoting proportionality within the jurispruden-
tial status quo. It argues that, while Anderson made it clear prosecutors are not
constitutionally bound to consider proportionality when exercising their discretion
in a way that binds sentencing judges, they should nevertheless regard themselves
as ethically bound to do so. I urge prosecutors to consider proportionality principles
when they exercise their discretion, and I suggest that prosecutors’ offices should
incorporate those principles into their Crown policy manuals. Section 4 acknowl-
edges, however, that this suggestion is of limited value because prosecutors’ ethical
obligations are difficult to enforce, and because they do not necessarily entail reme-
dies for criminal defendants who are affected by ethical breaches.
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Section 5 considers what can be done to ensure claimants have meaningful
remedies when they face disproportionate sentences as a result of mandatory mini-
mums. It provides a brief overview of the state of the law on s. 12 to explain why
that provision does not, at present, offer such remedies. It then considers how the s.
12 law might evolve, particularly in light of the Anderson Court’s affirmation that
proportionality is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7. Finally, the Conclu-
sion of the article anticipates future Supreme Court litigation on s. 12 and
mandatory minimum sentences, including the upcoming case of R. v. Nur, which
may give the Court an opportunity to implement the changes suggested in section
5.9
2. R. v. ANDERSON
On July 9, 2009, Frederick Anderson was charged with impaired driving and
driving with over eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of
blood.10 Before he entered his plea, and pursuant to s. 727 of the Criminal Code,
the Crown served notice of its intent to seek a greater punishment in light of Mr.
Anderson’s five prior impaired driving related convictions. Section 727 stipulates
that, where the Criminal Code contemplates a greater punishment by reason of pre-
vious convictions, that punishment cannot be imposed unless the Crown notifies
the offender of its intention to seek the greater punishment before the offender
makes his or her plea.11 In Mr. Anderson’s case, the Crown’s decision to file the
notice triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days under s. 255(1) of the
Criminal Code, which sets out escalating punishments for recidivist impaired driv-
ers. The combined effect of ss. 255(1) and 727 is that the Crown can elect to trigger
a harsher mandatory minimum sentence in some cases by filing a timely notice.
Mr. Anderson is Aboriginal. Special considerations inform the sentencing of
Aboriginal offenders. Section 718(2)(e) of the Criminal Code states: 
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the fol-
lowing principles [. . .] all available sanctions other than imprisonment that
are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders,
with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.12
As the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Gladue and again in R. v. Ipeelee, s. 718(2)(e)
is remedial in nature: it was enacted to address the staggering overrepresentation of
9 R. v. Nur, 2014 CarswellOnt 1486 (S.C.C.) [“Nur, S.C.C.”].
10 He was charged under ss. 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, supra note 3.
11 Criminal Code, ibid. at s. 727(1) states: “Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where an
offender is convicted of an offence for which a greater punishment may be imposed by
reason of previous convictions, no greater punishment shall be imposed on the offender
by reason thereof unless the prosecutor satisfies the court that the offender, before mak-
ing a plea, was notified that a greater punishment would be sought by reason thereof.”
12 Criminal Code, ibid. at s. 718(1).
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Aboriginal people in our prisons and to encourage judges to employ more cultur-
ally appropriate restorative approaches when sentencing Aboriginal offenders.13
The Crown policy manual for prosecutors in Newfoundland and Labrador, to
which the prosecutor in Mr. Anderson’s case presumably referred, directs Crown
Attorneys to request greater punishment under s. 255 except in certain cases. It
states that Crown Attorneys may exercise their discretion not to pursue an enhanced
penalty if, inter alia, all the prior convictions occurred more than five years before
the current offence, as was the case for Mr. Anderson.14 The policy then lists a
number of factors for Crowns to consider when exercising their discretion in this
regard. As Mr. Anderson pointed out in his submissions, Aboriginal status is not
among those factors. The Crown replied that Aboriginal status is encompassed by
one of the listed factors, namely “the background and circumstances of the of-
fender.”15 The Crown maintained, further, that the other factors militated in favour
of triggering the greater sentence in Mr. Anderson’s case.16
Mr. Anderson pled guilty to an impaired care and control charge. Before he
was sentenced, he challenged s. 255(1) of the Criminal Code under ss. 7 and 15 of
the Charter.17 The Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador found in his
13 R. v. Gladue, 1999 CarswellBC 778, 1999 CarswellBC 779, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 133
C.C.C. (3d) 385, 23 C.R. (5th) 197 at para. 93 (S.C.C.) [“Gladue”]; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012
SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2012 CarswellOnt 4376, 2012 CarswellOnt 4375, 280
C.C.C. (3d) 265, 91 C.R. (6th) 1 at paras. 56–59 [“Ipeelee”]. In Gladue the Court noted
that, in 1997, Aboriginal peoples represented about three percent of the Canadian popu-
lation but twelve percent of federal inmates. Id. at para. 58. Despite the introduction of
s. 718(2)(e) and its interpretation in Gladue, the disparity has worsened. In Ipeelee the
Court reported that, even following Gladue, s. 718(2) “has not had a discernible impact
on the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system.” The
Court attributed some of this failure to ongoing misunderstandings about the applica-
tion of s. 718(2) and the Gladue decision, both of which the Court sought to clarify in
Ipeelee. Id. at para. 63. As of February 2013, Aboriginal people constituted four per-
cent of the Canadian population but just over twenty-three percent of the federal inmate
population. Government of Canada Office of the Correctional Investigator, Back-
grounder: Aboriginal Offenders — A Critical Situation (September 16, 2013), online:
<http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/oth-aut/oth-aut20121022info-eng.aspx>.
14 R. v. Anderson, 2013 NLCA 2, 331 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 308, 295 C.C.C. (3d) 262, 2013
CarswellNfld 11 at para. 17; varied 2014 CSC 41, 2014 SCC 41, 2014 CarswellNfld
166, 2014 CarswellNfld 167, 11 C.R. (7th) 1 (S.C.C.) [“Anderson, N.L.C.A.”]. Mr.
Anderson’s convictions occurred between 1988 and 1997.
15 Ibid. at paras. 19-20.
16 Ibid., at para. 39. In particular, the Crown relied on the fact that Mr. Anderson had been
incarcerated for a previous related offence. The Court of Appeal was unimpressed by
this explanation and noted that the other Crown policy factors seemed to militate
against triggering the mandatory minimum sentence. The Supreme Court did not ad-
dress this issue in light of its holdings on the Charter claims and the applicable stan-
dard of review, which are discussed below.
17 Charter, ss. 7 & 15(1), supra note 4. Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Section 15(1) states: “Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
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favor on both issues and declared he would be sentenced on the basis that no mini-
mum sentence applied.18 The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal.19
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice Moldaver, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, allowed the appeal. He first considered Mr. Anderson’s
claim that there is a s. 7 principle of fundamental justice whereby Crown prosecu-
tors must consider an accused’s Aboriginal status when making discretionary deci-
sions that limit judges’ sentencing discretion, including the decision to file a notice
of the Crown’s intent to seek greater punishment. Justice Moldaver rejected this
claim on two grounds. First, he found it conflated the distinct roles of prosecutors
and judges: the duty to impose a proportionate sentence (including the duty to con-
sider Aboriginal status) applies only to judges, not to prosecutors.20 Second, he
found the principle articulated by Mr. Anderson did not qualify as a principle of
fundamental justice.21 To the contrary, it conflicts with “a long-standing and deeply
rooted approach to the division of responsibility between the Crown prosecutor and
the courts.”22 The Court has consistently limited the judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion, yet the proposed principle would entail sweeping judicial
review of prosecutors’ decisions. This is so because prosecutors have myriad op-
portunities to limit sentencing judges’ oversight: the choices they make when se-
lecting charges, making elections in the case of hybrid offences, and proving aggra-
vating factors at sentencing can all determine whether a mandatory minimum will
apply.
Having rejected the s. 7 claim, Justice Moldaver considered whether the
Crown’s decision to seek notice could be reviewed on other grounds. To this end,
he clarified the scope of prosecutorial discretion. In Krieger v. Law Society of Al-
berta, the Supreme Court had distinguished the exercise of “core prosecutorial dis-
cretion” from other prosecutorial decision-making.23 The former encompasses “de-
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimi-
nation based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.” The section 15 argument was not pursued before the Supreme
Court of Canada.
18 R. v. Anderson, 2011 NLPC 1709A00569 [“Anderson, Prov. Crt. N.L.”].
19 Anderson, N.L.C.A., supra note 14.
20 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at para. 25. See text accompanying infra note 34.
21 To qualify, the principle must: (i) “be a legal principle”; (ii) “enjoy consensus that the
rule or principle is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to
operate”; and (iii) “be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable stan-
dard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.”
Anderson, S.C.C, ibid. at para. 29, citing R. v. B. (D.), 2008 SCC 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3,
56 C.R. (6th) 203, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 338, 2008 CarswellOnt 2709, 2008 CarswellOnt
2708 at para. 26; and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 2004 Cars-
wellOnt 253, 2004 CarswellOnt 252, 16 C.R. (6th) 203 at para. 8. The proffered princi-
ple failed to meet the second requirement: it does not enjoy consensus that it is funda-
mental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate.
22 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at para. 30.
23 Krieger v. Law Society (Alberta), [2002] S.C.R. 372, 2002 CarswellAlta 1134, 2002
CarswellAlta 1133, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 4 C.R. (6th) 255, 2002 SCC 65.
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cisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney-
General’s participation in it.”24 It includes, but is not limited to, decisions to: prose-
cute a charge laid by police; take control of a private prosecution; charge multiple
offences; negotiate, accept, or repudiate a plea agreement; prefer a direct indict-
ment; proceed summarily or by indictment; pursue a dangerous offender applica-
tion; enter a stay of proceedings; withdraw from criminal proceedings; or initiate an
appeal. An exercise of core discretion is only reviewable for abuse of process, de-
fined as “Crown conduct that is egregious and seriously compromises trial fairness
and/or the integrity of the justice system.”25 Decisions that fall outside this cate-
gory — namely, tactics and conduct before the court — are subject to more expan-
sive review pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own
processes.26
Justice Moldaver noted confusion among lower courts attempting to apply
Krieger, which he attributed in part to the term “core” discretion. That term implies
a rather select class of discretionary decisions. In order to dispel confusion by un-
derscoring the category’s expansive scope, Justice Moldaver preferred the terms
“prosecutorial discretion” and “tactics and conduct before the court.” It appears,
then, that what has sometimes been called “core prosecutorial discretion” or the
“core elements of prosecutorial discretion” should now be referred to simply as
“prosecutorial discretion.”27
Justice Moldaver held that the Crown’s decision to file the notice falls within
the scope of prosecutorial discretion. In his view, that decision “fundamentally al-
ters the extent of prosecution — specifically, the extent of the jeopardy facing the
accused.”28 It is analogous to the decision to pursue a charge carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence, or to proceed by indictment where doing so will attract a
mandatory minimum. The decision to file notice is therefore only reviewable for
abuse of process. The claimant bears the burden of showing an abuse of process.
Here, Mr. Anderson failed to discharge that burden, having offered no evidence to
support an abuse of process claim.29 Justice Moldaver therefore allowed the
Crown’s appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted the mandatory min-
imum penalty of 120 days (though he stayed service of the remainder of the sen-
tence, per the Crown’s concession).
3. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
The balance of this article considers Anderson’s implications for the principle
of proportionality. That principle is codified in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code,
which stipulates that a criminal sentence “must be proportionate to the gravity of
24 Ibid. at paras. 30–32.
25 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at paras. 36 and 50.
26 Ibid. at para. 36.
27 Ibid. at para. 35.
28 Ibid. at para. 62 (emphasis in the original).
29 Ibid. at para. 63.
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the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender,”30 and it has been rec-
ognized as a principle of fundamental justice.31 For Aboriginal offenders, the
Gladue factors must inform the proportionality analysis since those factors bear on
the issue of what sentence is fit and appropriate. As Justice Moldaver observed in
Anderson, “[t]he failure of a sentencing judge to consider the unique circumstances
of Aboriginal offenders thus breaches both the judge’s statutory obligations, under
ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code, and the principle of fundamental justice that
sentences be proportionate.”32 Yet, despite the Court’s vigorous and consistent af-
firmation of the proportionality principle, it has done little to encourage that princi-
ple’s effective enforcement. Indeed, its Anderson ruling closes off a possible ave-
nue of enforcement by finding that prosecutors have no constitutional obligation to
consider proportionality when making decisions that bind sentencing judges’
hands, even if those decisions prevent sentencing judges from issuing proportionate
sentences.
The Anderson Court relied heavily on the different roles of prosecutors and
judges to support both of its key conclusions — namely, that prosecutorial discre-
tion is an expansive category that attracts minimal review; and that the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is not encumbered by a s. 7 obligation to ensure proportion-
ality. These twin holdings reflect a common view of the structure of the criminal
justice system, yet read together, they reveal a significant tension.
The Court’s s. 7 analysis turned on its view that judges and prosecutors have
different institutional roles that must be kept separate. Justice Moldaver wrote: 
Mr. Anderson’s argument in effect equates the duty of the judge and the
prosecutor, but there is no basis in law to support equating their distinct
roles in the sentencing process. It is the judge’s responsibility to impose
sentence; likewise, it is the judge’s responsibility, within the applicable le-
gal parameters, to craft a proportionate sentence.33
The Court feared that collapsing these roles by obligating prosecutors to consider
proportionality, and thereby subjecting their discretionary decisions to greater judi-
cial review, would “put at risk the adversarial nature of our criminal justice system
by hobbling Crown prosecutors in the performance of their work” and would be
“contrary to our constitutional traditions.”34
The Court’s analysis of the scope of prosecutorial discretion likewise turned
on the prosecutor’s distinct institutional role. The Court insisted prosecutorial dis-
cretion is “expansive” and must be insulated from most types of review: “The many
decisions that Crown prosecutors are called upon to make in the exercise of their
prosecutorial discretion must not be subjected to routine second-guessing by
courts.”35 It reasoned that judicial second-guessing would upset the separation of
30 Criminal Code, supra note 3 at s. 718.1.
31 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at paras. 21-22; and Ipeelee, supra note 13 at paras. 36-
37.
32 Anderson, ibid. at para. 24.
33 Ibid. at para. 25 (emphasis in the original).
34 Ibid. at paras. 31 and 32.
35 Ibid. at paras. 44 and 46.
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powers between the Attorney General and his or her agents, on the one hand, and
the courts on the other; that it would reduce trial efficiency; and that in any event,
prosecutors are more competent than judges when it comes to the exercise of their
discretion.36
The Court observed, further, that the more expansive judicial review sought by
Mr. Anderson would open the proverbial floodgates by subjecting many more
prosecutorial decisions to review: “As the Crown has pointed out, the situations
where Crown decisions have the potential to limit the sentencing judge’s options
and therefore the judge’s ability to take s. 718(2)(e) into account are many.”37 In
the Court’s view, the large number of prosecutorial decisions that impact sentenc-
ing outcomes makes robust judicial review impractical. In essence, then, the Court
found that prosecutors cannot be constitutionally required to ensure proportionality
precisely because there are so many cases in which proportionality turns on their
decisions. By extension, judges must be solely responsible for achieving propor-
tionate sentences even though (or indeed, because) there are so many situations in
which they might be prevented from achieving proportionate sentences. This rea-
soning puts judges in an untenable position. Concretely, it means judges are sup-
posed to unilaterally ensure proportionate sentences, even though prosecutors’ de-
cisions — which are not burdened by the proportionality requirement — frequently
hamper their ability to do so. One can be forgiven for asking, in response to the
Supreme Court’s avowal that “it is the judge’s responsibility [. . .] to craft a propor-
tionate sentence,” how judges can effectively discharge this duty.
This problem is significant because the Court is absolutely right when it notes
the significant number of prosecutorial decisions that impact sentencing outcomes.
The Canadian criminal justice system is increasingly characterized by mandatory
minimum sentences. There are now, by some counts, around 100 mandatory mini-
mum sentences on the books in Canada.38 This represents about a tenfold increase
since the Supreme Court released its flagship decision on the constitutionality of
mandatory minimums in 1987.39 Much of the increase has occurred within the past
ten years, and the trend continues today with new legislation coming down the pipe
that would further increase mandatory minimum sentences.40 With increased
36 Ibid. at paras. 46-47.
37 Ibid. at para. 31.
38 See Parkes, supra note 1 at 149.
39 Ibid. at 149-50: “In 1987, when the Supreme Court of Canada decided R. v. Smith
[supra note 5], the foundational case interpreting section 12 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the right to be free from ‘cruel and unusual treatment or punish-
ment’, there were just nine mandatory minimum sentences on the books” (citations
omitted).
40 See, for example, Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (trafficking in contra-
band tobacco), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (Committee Report Presented in the House of
Commons, 12 February 2014); Bill C-26, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the
Canada Evidence Act and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, to enact the
High Risk Child Sex Offender Database Act and to make consequential amendments to
other Acts, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (Introduction & First Reading in the House of
Commons, 26 February 2014); Bill C-217, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mis-
chief relating to war memorials), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (Committee Report Presen-
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mandatory minimum sentences comes enhanced prosecutorial power. As we have
seen, prosecutors play a key role in deciding whether mandatory minimums will
apply, and hence in determining the scope of judicial discretion at the sentencing
phase. In this climate, if we truly value the principle of proportionate sentencing,
we must establish some mechanism for ensuring proportionate sentencing out-
comes in the context of prosecutor-driven mandatory minimum sentences. The
Court has treated the sheer number of prosecutorial decisions that impact sentenc-
ing outcomes as a reason why expansive judicial review is impractical; but if we
take the principle of proportionality seriously, then that same fact is a reason why
expansive judicial review is crucial.
Moreover, we should take proportionality seriously. As the Anderson Court
itself stated, quoting Ipeelee, “[p]roportionality is the sine qua non of a just sen-
tence.”41 Indeed, proportionality is central to how we justify the institution of crim-
inal punishment in the first place. In 1984, Canada established the Canadian Sen-
tencing Commission (“the Sentencing Commission”), which recommended that
Parliament articulate a uniform national sentencing policy.42 At the time the Sen-
tencing Commission made this recommendation, the principle most frequently in-
voked to justify criminal punishment was deterrence. Commentators expressed
concern, however, that extreme and outrageous punishments are often justified on
the basis of deterrence, and that it is fundamentally unfair to visit harm upon one
person just to influence how another will act in the future. The Sentencing Com-
mission therefore recommended a sentencing policy that would synthesize utilita-
rian considerations like deterrence with the principle of retributivism.43 Retributiv-
ism casts punishment in terms of “just desserts.” Because it insists that the offender
must “deserve” the punishment, it operates to limit the scope of permissible penal-
ties: any additional measure of punishment beyond what is deserved by the of-
fender’s moral blameworthiness is illegitimate. Retributivist sentencing theory thus
cashes out as the principle of proportionality, which serves to limit utilitarian pun-
ishment goals like deterrence. As Justice Lebel, writing for the Court in R. v. Naso-
galuak, explained, proportionality “requires that a sentence not exceed what is just
and appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of
the offence. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function.”44
ted to the Senate, 4 March 2014); Bill C-239, An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(peace officers), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (Reinstated from Previous Session, 16 Oc-
tober 2013); Bill C-394, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the National Defence
Act (criminal organization recruitment), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (In Committee
(Senate) as of 1 April 2014); and Bill C-570 An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(mandatory minimum sentences for rape), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, (Second Reading
in the House of Commons, 29 January 2014).
41 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at para. 21, quoting Ipeelee, supra note 13 at para. 36.
42 The Honourable Justice Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral
Principle of Punishment” (2008) 28:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 57, 67.
43 Ibid.
44 R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 2010 CarswellAlta 269, 2010
CarswellAlta 268, 251 C.C.C. (3d) 293, 72 C.R. (6th) 1 at para. 42 (emphasis in the
original) [“Nasogaluak”].
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Parliament adopted the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations in 1996.
Now, the Criminal Code specifies that criminal punishment has a utilitarian pur-
pose — to contribute to respect for the law and to the maintenance of a just, peace-
ful, and safe society45 — while the fundamental principle of sentencing is retribu-
tivist: all sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the
offender’s degree of responsibility.46 In light of this principle, a sentence ought
never to be disproportionate, irrespective of its deterrent effects. In Nasogaluak,
Justice LeBel insisted that “whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the
objectives listed [in the Criminal Code, such as denunciation, general and specific
deterrence, etc.], the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of
proportionality.”47 He noted, further, that while this fundamental principle is en-
shrined in the Code, it predates it: proportionality has a “long history as a guiding
principle in sentencing.”48
From all this it follows that criminal sentences in Canada must be proportion-
ate, even where those sentences are dictated by mandatory minimums. But, how
can we ensure sentences are indeed proportionate in that context? The Anderson
Court foreclosed one potential avenue: a s. 7 requirement that prosecutors consider
proportionality when making discretionary decisions that limit the range of availa-
ble sentences.49 Its decision to do so is, I think, defensible. The Court is correct that
the separation of powers, and the basic architecture of the adversarial system more
generally, would be compromised by expansive judicial review of all the
prosecutorial decisions that shape or limit sentencing ranges. To understand why,
we need only imagine a system in which defendants could ask judges to rule on
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions to pursue certain charges, to accept or decline
proposed plea agreements, to proceed summarily or by indictment, to prove partic-
ular aggravating factors at sentencing, and so forth. As the Court rightly notes, this
sort of judicial oversight would hamper both the prosecutor and the judge. Prosecu-
tors would be unable to make independent decisions about whether and how to
proceed with prosecutions, while judges would be in the untenable position of hav-
45 Criminal Code, supra note 3, s. 718.
46 Ibid. at s. 718.1. The Court described the integrated, retributivist-utilitarian approach in
R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CarswellBC 1000F, 1996 CarswellBC 1000, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327,
46 C.R. (4th) 269, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 559: “[I]t is important to stress that neither
retribution nor denunciation alone provides an exhaustive justification for the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions. Rather, in our system of justice, normative and utilitarian
considerations operate in conjunction with one another to provide a coherent justifica-
tion for criminal punishment.”
47 Nasogaluak, supra note 44 at para. 40 (emphasis in the original).
48 Ibid. at para. 41.
49 The Court specifically considered whether section 7 requires the Crown to take the
accused’s Aboriginal status into account when making decisions that limit the judge’s
sentencing options, but its reasoning would apply equally to a more general claim that
the Crown should be constitutionally obligated to consider proportionality when mak-
ing these types of decisions. The Court’s comments on the nature of the prosecutorial
role clearly indicate its unwillingness to promote proportionality through the judicial
oversight of prosecutorial decision-making.
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ing to oversee prosecutors’ decisions about how to frame cases while simultane-
ously remaining neutral arbiters of those same cases.
The Court was arguably correct, then, to deny Mr. Anderson’s section 7 claim.
But, having foreclosed that option, it must do something else to ensure proportion-
ality in a world of expanded prosecutorial power and limited judicial discretion. In
the remainder of this article, I suggest two alternatives for realizing the principle of
proportionality within the contemporary criminal justice system. These alternatives
are not mutually exclusive. First, I suggest that, although prosecutors are not consti-
tutionally required to consider proportionality, they should regard themselves as
ethically bound to do so. The Crown’s overarching ethical obligation to act as a
minister of justice must, I argue, encompass an obligation to seek proportionate
sentences. Second, I suggest the Court should relax the standards for demonstrating
that a mandatory minimum sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under s. 12, thereby giving judges an effective tool for avoiding disproportionate
sentences that would otherwise be required by mandatory minimums. This latter
solution would be compatible with the separation of powers envisaged in Anderson,
and would alleviate the tension that Anderson creates.
I turn, first, to the issue of prosecutorial ethics.
4. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE PROSECUTOR AS MINISTER
OF JUSTICE
Crown attorneys are “ministers of justice.” As such, their role is not to seek
the highest sentences possible — or indeed, to pursue convictions — but to ensure
justice is done.50 The Supreme Court has affirmed this principle on numerous occa-
sions.51 In R. v. Regan, it identified three non-exhaustive facets of the “minister of
50 R. v. Boucher, 20 C.R. 1, 1954 CarswellQue 14, 110 C.C.C. 263, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 23
[“Boucher”] (“It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution
is not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be
credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime”). See also Graeme G.
Mitchell, “‘No Joy in This for Anyone’: Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion in R. v. Latimer” (2001), 614 Sask. L. Rev. 491, 495 (“It is trite to observe
that ‘Crown counsel’s role within the criminal justice system is unique.’ Indeed, the
dual public functions performed by a prosecutor are well-known and have received
considerable judicial and extra-judicial commentary” (citations omitted)) [“Mitchell”].
51 See e.g. Boucher, ibid. at 24 (“The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning
or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be
none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with
an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial
proceedings”); Nelles v. Ontario, 1989 CarswellOnt 415, 1989 CarswellOnt 963, 71
C.R. (3d) 358, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 at 191 (“Traditionally the Crown Attorney has been
described as a ‘minister of justice’ and ‘ought to regard himself as part of the Court
rather than as an advocate’” (quoting Morris Manning, “Abuse of Power by Crown
Attorneys” [1979] L.S.U.C. Lectures 571, at p. 580, quoting Henry Bull, Q.C.)); R. v.
Stinchcombe, 1991 CarswellAlta 192, 1991 CarswellAlta 559, 8 C.R. (4th) 277, 68
C.C.C. (3d) 1, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 at 341 (“The tradition of Crown counsel in this
country carrying out their role as ‘ministers of justice’ and not as adversaries has gener-
ally been very high”); R. v. Bain, 1992 CarswellOnt 981, 1992 CarswellOnt 66, 69
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justice” role: objectivity, i.e. “the duty to deal dispassionately with the facts as they
are, uncoloured by subjective emotions or prejudices”; independence, including
from the police and the defence; and “lack of animus — either negative or posi-
tive — towards the suspect or accused. The Crown Attorney is expected to act in an
even-handed way.”52 These duties underpin the core obligation to seek a just out-
come in each case.
To seek a just outcome, the Crown Attorney must, of course, make a judicious
and balanced charging decision at the outset.53 The initial charging decision is es-
pecially crucial when it entails a mandatory minimum sentence, since it may dictate
the ultimate sentence. The Crown Attorney’s obligation to act as a minister of jus-
tice also extends to the sentencing phase more generally. Thus, the Crown ought
not to request the highest possible sentence in every case, but should rather seek a
fit and proportionate sentence. As Justice Gray of the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice recently remarked, 
In many, if not most, cases, the accused will argue for the lowest possible
sentence consistent with the requisites of the Criminal Code and appellate
authority. On the other hand the Crown, as representative of the public inter-
est, will not necessarily argue for the longest possible sentence. Counsel for
the Crown, as a “Minister of Justice”, is expected to take a more balanced
approach.54
This more balanced approach requires Crown Attorneys to consider the principle of
proportionality, particularly when making decisions that directly shape criminal
sentences, such as those that trigger mandatory minimum sentences.55 The obliga-
C.C.C. (3d) 481, 10 C.R. (4th) 257, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 at 118 (“The single-minded
pursuit of convictions cannot be compatible with the responsibilities of Crown prosecu-
tors” (per Gonthier J., dissenting on other grounds); and R. v. Regan, 2002 CarswellNS
62, 2002 CarswellNS 61, 161 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 49 C.R. (5th) 1, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 297 at para. 157 (“the duty of a Crown Attorney to respect his or her ‘Minister
of justice” obligations of objectivity and independence is [. . .] an essential protection
of the citizen against the sometimes overzealous or misdirected exercise of state power.
It is one of the more important checks and balances of our criminal justice system”)
[“Regan”].
52 Regan, ibid. at para. 156.
53 Mitchell, supra note 50 at 500 (“[D]uring the charging phase, the prosecutor is called
upon to fulfill her quasi-judicial role in its purest form. No semblance of the adversarial
stance the prosecutor will assume later in the process should intrude upon the initial
decision whether to initiate a formal criminal charge and what particular charge to lay.
So central is this decision to Crown counsel’s role as a ‘minister of justice’, a fact
highlighted by the courts’s aversion to re-evaluating it on an application for judicial
review, that a prosecutor is professionally and constitutionally obliged to make it with
the greatest prudence and care.”).
54 R. v. Adamson, 2013 ONSC 2365, 2013 CarswellOnt 5666 (S.C.J.) at para. 21.
55 For empirical studies of how prosecutors use their charging discretion to lessen the
effects of some mandatory minimums in the United States where mandatory minimum
sentences are more common, see David Bjerk, “Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing” (2005) 48
Journal of Law and Economics 591; and Jeffery T. Ulmer, Megan C. Kurlychek &
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tion falls squarely within their duty to act as ministers of justice. This is so even
though to consider that principle it does not constitute an independent constitutional
duty under s. 7.
Significantly, the Anderson Court’s overarching rationale for denying a s. 7
obligation to consider proportionality — preserving prosecutorial discretion and in-
dependence — was based upon the Crown obligation to act as a minister of justice.
The Court remarked: 
[T]he fundamental importance of prosecutorial discretion [lies] not in pro-
tecting the interests of individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the
public interest by enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in
fulfillment of their professional obligations without fear of judicial or politi-
cal interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as ministers of
justice.56
In essence, then, the Court declined to find that Crown Attorneys are constitution-
ally obligated to consider proportionality when exercising their discretion in a way
that binds sentencing judges so as to enhance the ability of Crowns to act as minis-
ters of justice. Yet, to act as ministers of justice, Crown Attorneys must consider
proportionality when exercising their discretion in a manner that reduces judges’
sentencing options.
In my view, prosecutors’ offices should emphasize the Crown’s obligation to
act as a minister of justice by updating their Crown policy manuals to ensure the
guidelines for triggering mandatory minimum sentences address proportionality
considerations — including, of course, Aboriginal status.57 In this way, they can
reinforce and clarify Crown Attorneys’ ethical duties while improving criminal jus-
tice outcomes.
That said, neither Crown policies nor an elaboration of prosecutors’ ethical
obligations is a panacea. Neither provides the transparency that characterizes the
traditional sentencing process. When judges sentence, they are expected to articu-
late their rationales, and their decisions are subject to appeal. In contrast,
prosecutorial decisions that restrict judicial sentencing discretion are private and, as
the Anderson Court affirmed, are generally not subject to review. While Crown
policies may, of course, be publicly available, prosecutors’ decisions about how to
apply those policies in individual cases are made privately: Crown Attorneys are
generally not required to publicly articulate their decision-making processes or to
John H. Kramer, “Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2007) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 427 (noting inter
alia, that prosecutors’ discretionary decisions to trigger mandatory minimum sentences
were biased against racial minorities).
56 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at para. 37, quoting Kvello v. Miazga, 2009 SCC 51,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, 2009 CarswellSask 718, 2009 CarswellSask 717 at para. 47 (quo-
tation marks omitted).
57 For a general discussion of the pros and cons of detailed, publicly available Crown
policy manuals, see Michael Code, “The Attorney General in the 21st Century: A Trib-
ute to Ian Scott: Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion” (2009) 34 Queen’s L.J.
863.
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otherwise justify their discretionary decisions.58 This lack of transparency reduces
public scrutiny and makes it harder to prove an individual Crown has neglected his
or her ethical obligations or ignored governing policy. Moreover, even if a devia-
tion from policy or an ethical breach can be proved, it will not necessarily entail a
remedy for the offender who receives a disproportionate sentence as a result.
Finally, even if a prosecutor abides by his or her ethical obligation to consider
proportionality at the charging phase, the case could unfold in such a way that the
ultimate sentence required by the prosecutor’s charging decision will turn out to be
disproportionate. An example of this problem is offered by Justice Molloy’s analy-
sis in R. v. Smickle, which was cited with approval by Justice Doherty in R. v.
Nur.59 Justice Molloy posited a hypothetical example of a grossly disproportionate
sentence resulting from a mandatory minimum penalty, based on the true case of R.
v. Snobelen.60 The accused in Snobelen moved from a ranch in Oklahoma to On-
tario, then had his personal property shipped to him. He eventually realized the
shipped property included a restricted firearm and ammunition that was not li-
censed and registered in Canada. Before he disposed of the firearm, his wife, with
whom he was having marital problems, reported it to the police. He was charged
with possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited weapon. The Crown proceeded
summarily and he received an absolute discharge. Justice Molloy noted that if, in
addition to these facts, the Crown had a credible allegation the accused had used his
possession of the firearm to intimidate his wife, then it could reasonably have de-
cided to proceed by indictment at the initial charging phase, thereby triggering a
three-year mandatory minimum sentence. If the accused were subsequently con-
victed of the possession offence but the allegations of intimidation were not proved,
the judge would be obliged to impose the three-year sentence even though it would
be disproportionate on the established facts. Notably, such a scenario could occur
even if the Crown gave due consideration to the proportionality principle when
making its initial charging decision. This hypothetical illustrates how the evidence
that is relevant to the proportionality analysis may emerge and unfold over time.
58 Where a claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation for an abuse of process
claim, however, the evidentiary burden may shift to the Crown, which may then be
obliged to explain its impugned decision. This shift may be required because the
Crown is often the only party privy to the relevant information. If the Crown does not
provide a satisfactory explanation, then that failure may weigh heavily in favour of the
claimant. The claimant retains the ultimate burden of proving the abuse of process. In
addition, Crown policy guidelines may be relevant to the court’s analysis, although
they are not themselves subject to Charter scrutiny in the abstract because they do not
have the force of law. Anderson, S.C.C., supra note 7 at paras. 52–56, citing R. v.
Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, 2011 CarswellAlta 989, 2011 CarswellAlta
988, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 36, 85 C.R. (6th) 1 at para. 63.
59 R. v. Smickle, 2012 ONSC 602, 91 C.R. (6th) 132, 2012 CarswellOnt 1484 (S.C.J.), at
para. 111, ; reversed 2013 ONCA 678, 2013 CarswellOnt 15936, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 371,
5 C.R. (7th) 359; reversed 2014 ONCA 49, 2014 CarswellOnt 620, 306 C.C.C. (3d)
351; R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 474, 5 C.R. (7th) 292, 2013 Cars-
wellOnt 15898 at para. 159; leave to appeal allowed 2014 CarswellOnt 4607, 2014
CarswellOnt 4606 (S.C.C.) [“Nur, ONCA”].
60 R. v. Snobelen (April 25, 2008), [2008] O.J. No. 6021, S. D. Brown J. (Ont. C.J.).
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Thus, while the Crown’s ethical obligation to consider proportionality when
making discretionary decisions that limit the judge’s sentencing options should be
recognized and affirmed, it should not be regarded as a cure-all. Indeed, the Court
has made clear that the existence of prosecutorial discretion cannot remedy an oth-
erwise unconstitutional sentencing regime.61 In sum, recognizing that prosecutors
are ethically bound to seek proportionate sentences is necessary to ensure that they
act as ministers of justice, but it is not sufficient to ensure that offenders receive
proportionate sentences.
5. DISPROPORTIONALITY AND GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY
UNDER THE CHARTER
What options remain, then, for ensuring the principle of proportionality en-
shrined in s. 718 of the Criminal Code — including the requirement that due con-
sideration be given to Aboriginal status — is preserved in the era of mandatory
minimum sentences? The Anderson Court pointed to the answer: “If a mandatory
minimum regime requires a judge to impose a disproportionate sentence, the re-
gime should be challenged.”62 In other words, the claimant ought not to attack the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that triggers the mandatory minimum sentence,
but rather the mandatory minimum sentence itself. The traditional avenue for doing
so — and the one we must assume the Court had in mind — is a claim that the
mandated sentence violates the s. 12 Charter guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment or treatment.63
There are, however, significant limitations built into the s. 12 jurisprudence
that make it an ineffective tool for dismantling mandatory minimums resulting in
disproportionate sentences. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Mr. Anderson expressly
did not challenge the sentencing provisions under s. 12 of the Charter before any
court, relying exclusively on the more novel and untested ss. 7 and 15 claims.64
One can assume he did not expect a s. 12 challenge would succeed, even if he
could prove his sentence was disproportionate insofar as it did not reflect his Ab-
original status (a claim that underpinned his ss. 7 and 15 Charter arguments).
In the remainder of this article, I will argue that if the Court views s. 12 as the
appropriate basis for redressing disproportionate sentences (as Anderson suggests),
and if it is committed to the core principle of proportionality for both Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal offenders (as Anderson also suggests), then it must revise its s.
61 Smith, supra note 5 at 1078 (“In my view the section cannot be salvaged by relying on
the discretion of the prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, in the opin-
ion of the prosecution, its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so
would be to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that
any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect to the extent
of the inconsistency and the courts are duty bound to make that pronouncement, not to
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else for that
matter.”)
62 Anderson, S.C.C., supra note 7 at para. 25.
63 Section 12 of the Charter states, “Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” Charter, s. 12, supra note 4.
64 Anderson, Prov. Crt. N.L., supra note 18 at para. 15.
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12 jurisprudence. At present, s. 12 simply does not do enough to protect
proportionality.
(a) Section 12 and mandatory minimum sentences
The test for determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence contravenes
s. 12 was established in R. v. Smith.65 It has two parts. First, the court must con-
sider whether the impugned mandatory minimum sentence is “grossly dispropor-
tionate” in the case at hand, given the particular circumstances of the offence and
the offender before the court. Second, if the mandated sentence is not grossly dis-
proportionate in the case at hand, then the court must consider whether it would be
grossly disproportionate in other cases; that is, whether it would result in gross
disproportionality in “reasonable hypothetical” scenarios. The underlying logic is
that, if the sentence would be grossly disproportionate as applied to some cases,
then it is ipso facto unconstitutional and hence cannot be applied in any cases, in-
cluding the case at hand. (Of course, the result could by a hallow victory for the
claimant, since the court could strike down the mandatory minimum as unconstitu-
tional but still affirm the claimant’s sentence on the basis that, while the sentence is
no longer mandatory, it is justified in the claimant’s case by the usual sentencing
principles.66)
The gross disproportionality standard that animates both prongs of the test is a
demanding one. A sentence will not satisfy that standard if it is “merely excessive”;
rather, “[t]he sentence must be ‘so excessive as to outrage standards of decency’
and disproportionate to the extent that Canadians ‘would find the punishment ab-
horrent or intolerable.’”67 Scholars have criticized the logic and justice of the gross
disproportionality standard.68 According to Jamie Cameron, the gross dispropor-
tionality standard “demands reexamination against the objectives of section 12.”69
Allan Manson remarks, “we have not arrived at [the gross disproportionality stan-
65 Smith, supra note 5.
66 Smith, ibid. is illustrative. In that case, Justice Lamer (as he then was), writing for the
majority, indicated that he would have dismissed the appellant’s appeal against his
eight-year sentence, despite having found that the seven-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence was unconstitutional, on the grounds that the Court of Appeal had affirmed the
sentence was fit in the circumstances of the appellant’s case. He instead sent the case
back for resentencing, however, because the Crown had conceded during oral argument
that this would be the best course of action.
67 R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 54 C.R. (6th)
197, 2008 CarswellAlta 229, 2008 CarswellAlta 228 at para. 14 (citations omitted)
[“Ferguson”].
68 See e.g. Cameron, supra note 6; and Allan Manson, “Arbitrary Disproportionality: A
New Charter Standard for Measuring the Constitutionality of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 173 [“Manson”]. For criticisms of the evolving
application of the “gross disproportionality” standard in the context of mandatory mini-
mums, see Kent Roach, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy” (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall L.J. 367; and Hélène Dumont, “Disarming Canadians, and Arming
Them with Tolerance: Banning Firearms and Minimum Sentences to Control Violent
Crime. An Essay or an Apparent Contradiction” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329.
69 Cameron, supra note 6 at 584.
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dard] by thoughtful reflection on the purposes and scope of section 12 and the
‘cruel and unusual’ concept. Instead, we are here essentially by default.”70 Quite
simply, it is hard to defend the Court’s insistence on gross disproportionality,
which leaves “merely” disproportionate sentences intact, given the Court’s repeated
affirmation that proportionality is the “sine qua non of a just sentence.”71
The Smith Court justified the gross disproportionality requirement on the
grounds that a lower standard would result in too many sentences being struck
down as unconstitutional, diminishing the significance of the Charter and interfer-
ing excessively with the legislature’s determinations about appropriate sentences. It
concluded: “We should be careful not to stigmatize every disproportionate or ex-
cessive sentence as being a constitutional violation, and should leave to the usual
sentencing appeal process the task of reviewing the fitness of a sentence.”72 Of
course, the suggestion that disproportionate sentences can be reduced through the
usual sentencing appeal process is fallacious in the context of mandatory minimum
sentences, where that remedy is unavailable.
Despite the demanding gross disproportionality requirement, the Smith case
seemed promising from the perspective of claimants seeking to challenge
mandatory minimum sentences. This is so because the Court’s application of the
second prong of the test, the “reasonable hypothetical” analysis, suggested that
most mandatory minimums could in fact be characterized as grossly disproportion-
ate. In Smith, the Court held that the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence at
issue was not grossly disproportionate in the case before it, where the offender had
imported seven and a half ounces of high-grade cocaine from Bolivia, but that this
same sentence would be grossly disproportionate if applied to “a young person
who, while driving back into Canada from a winter break in the U.S.A., [was]
caught with only one, indeed, let’s postulate, his or her first ‘joint of grass.’”73 In
other words, the Court imagined “the most innocent possible offender,” then as-
sessed whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be disproportionate in his
or her case.74
Justice Doherty recently observed that, 
As described in Smith, the virtues of the hypothetical offender and the miti-
gating factors relevant to the commission of the offence seem limited only
by the imaginations of counsel and judges. Unmodified, the hypothetical
offender analysis described in Smith would have left very few, if any,
mandatory minimum jail terms standing.75
This is so because statutory criminal offences are drafted in such abstract, general
terms that they normally apply to a wide range of scenarios. As such, it will usually
70 Manson, supra note 68 174.
71 Anderson, S.C.C, supra note 7 at para. 21, quoting Ipeelee, supra note 13 at para. 36.
72 Smith, supra note 5 at 55.
73 Smith, ibid. at 1053.
74 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (2007-Rel. 1), 5th ed. (To-
ronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2007), at 53.3 [“Hogg”].
75 Nur, ONCA, supra note 59 at para. 116. See also Hogg, ibid. at 53.4, noting that “no
minimum sentence, however short, could possibly survive the relentless application of
the most innocent possible offender principle.”
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be easy to come up with at least one scenario wherein the facts of the case satisfy
the elements of the offence, but the circumstances are so sympathetic or innocuous
that the mandatory minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate. Thus,
following Smith, it seemed the reasonable hypothetical analysis would make the
gross disproportionality standard quite attainable.
As Jamie Cameron notes, however, “[a]ny expectation that the [s. 12] jurispru-
dence would blossom after Smith was dashed by a series of decisions which, to-
gether, show that the Supreme Court regards section 12 as a ‘faint hope’ guarantee
of sorts — one available only on rare occasions and in exceptional circum-
stances.”76 Those decisions yanked the teeth out of the reasonable hypothetical
analysis, making it harder for claimants to succeed on that basis. Most significantly,
in R. v. Goltz and again in R. v. Morrisey, the Court held that the “reasonable hypo-
thetical” must be “common.”77 Remote or unlikely scenarios — including those
based on the facts of real but unusual reported cases — are not to be considered.78
Justice Gonthier on behalf of the Court in Goltz wrote: “The means and pur-
poses of legislative bodies are not to be easily upset in a challenge under s. 12.”79
And indeed, the mandatory minimums established by the legislature are not easily
upset. Since Smith, the Court has denied every s. 12 challenge to mandatory mini-
mum sentences that has come before it, and the Ontario Court of Appeal has a
similarly parsimonious record.80 Peter Hogg reports, “the Supreme Court, while
never expressly disavowing anything said or done in Smith, has gradually become
more and more deferential to Parliament when reviewing mandatory minimum
76 Cameron, supra note 6 at 583. See also Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Consti-
tutionality of Mandatory Sentences”, (2001) Osgoode Hall L.J. 367, 408 (“The recent
section 12 cases suggest that Parliament can create mandatory sentences without wor-
rying very much that they may be invalidated on the basis of hypothetical best offend-
ers”) [“Roach”].
77 R. v. Goltz, 1991 CarswellBC 924, 1991 CarswellBC 280, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 8 C.R.
(4th) 82, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, 515; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, 148 C.C.C. (3d)
1, 36 C.R. (5th) 85, 2000 SCC 39, 2000 CarswellNS 256, 2000 CarswellNS 255 at
para. 33.
78 For a fuller description of the post-Smith changes to the reasonable hypothetical analy-
sis, see esp. Nur, ONCA, supra note 59 at paras. 110–142.
79 Supra note 77 at 501.
80 Parkes, supra note 1 at 154; Roach, supra note 76 at 370; Nur, ONCA supra note 59 at
70 (noting that “[a]fter Smith, no decision of the Supreme Court of Canada or this court
has declared a mandatory minimum jail term unconstitutional under s. 12,” but then
finding a section 12 violation in the case at hand.)
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sentences.”81 Don Stuart describes the Court’s post-Smith record as “one of retreat
and timidity.”82
(b) Reconsidering section 12 in light of mandatory minimum sentences
As we have seen, s. 12 only prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences; but
notably, the Anderson Court affirmed that proportionality is a s. 7 principle of fun-
damental justice — albeit one that does not bind prosecutors.83 This is not the first
time the Court has identified proportionality as a s. 7 principle. In Ipeelee, it stated:
“proportionality in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamen-
tal justice under s. 7 of the Charter.”84 Read together with the Court’s s. 12 juris-
prudence, these statements about s. 7 suggest that a “merely” disproportionate sen-
tence contravenes s. 7 of the Charter but not s. 12. This result is not only bizarre
and counterintuitive; it is inconsistent with the basic structure of the Charter. The
Court has made clear that the Charter principles are “mutually reinforcing” and
that ss. 7 and 12 should not result in competing standards.85 In Smith, Justice McIn-
tyre (dissenting, but not on this point) said: 
While section 7 sets out broad and general rights which often extend over
the same ground as other rights set out in the Charter, it cannot be read so
broadly as to render other rights nugatory. If section 7 were found to impose
greater restrictions on punishment than s. 12 — for example by prohibiting
punishments which were merely excessive — it would entirely subsume s.
12 and render it otiose.86
Similarly, in R. v. Malmo-Levine, the Court concluded that adopting different pro-
portionality standards under ss. 7 and 12 “would render incoherent the scheme of
interconnected ‘legal rights’ set out in ss. 7 to 14 the Charter,” adding that this
result “would be unacceptable.”87
Sections 7 and 12 should encompass the same rights and restrictions, then. But
if this is so, then how ought we to reconcile the s. 12 gross disproportionality stan-
81 Hogg, supra note 74 at 53.4. Hogg appears to endorse this trend. For other, more criti-
cal accounts of the same trend, see e.g. Roach, supra note 76 at 370; Kent Roach, “The
Charter versus the Government’s Crime Agenda” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 211, 226;
Lisa Dufraimont, “R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to
Mandatory Minimum Sentences under section 12” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459, 472;
and Don Stuart, “The Charter Balance against Unscrupulous Law and Order Politics,”
(2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 13, 37 [“Stuart”].
82 Stuart, ibid. at 37.
83 Anderson, S.C.C., supra note 7 at 21-22.
84 Ipeelee, supra note 13 at 36.
85 Gosselin c. Québec (Procureur général), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84, 2002
CarswellQue 2706, 2002 CarswellQue 2707 at para. 144, citing R. v. L. (T.P.), 1987
CarswellNS 342, 1987 CarswellNS 41, 61 C.R. (3d) 1, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1, [1987] 2
S.C.R. 309 at p. 326; and R. v. Tran, 1994 CarswellNS 435, 1994 CarswellNS 24, 92
C.C.C. (3d) 218, 32 C.R. (4th) 34, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951 at p. 976.
86 Smith, supra note 5 at 1107.
87 R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417, 2003
CarswellBC 3134, 2003 CarswellBC 3133, 16 C.R. (6th) 1 at para. 160. Here is the
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dard with the Court’s statement that proportionality is a principle of fundamental
justice? As I see it, the Court has four options. It could simply tolerate the inconsis-
tency. This option is hardly viable as a jurisprudential position, however; it would,
in essence, mean that the s. 7 principle of proportionality amounts to a right without
a remedy; but “a right without a remedy is antithetical to one of the purposes of the
Charter which surely is to allow courts to fashion remedies when constitutional
infringements occur.”88 Alternatively, the Court could abandon both the s. 7 pro-
portionality principle and the s. 12 gross disproportionality requirement in favour
of some alternative, consistent standard. This option is hardly viable either, and it is
certainly unlikely, since it would destabilize basic sentencing principles and require
an overhaul of two separate areas of Charter law.
More realistically, the Court could resolve the inconsistency by holding that
both ss. 7 and 12 only prohibit grossly disproportionate sentences, or that they both
prohibit disproportionate sentences. It could pursue the former option through a s. 7
balancing analysis. The Court has adopted an internal balancing approach to s. 7,
stating: “Fundamental justice requires that a fair balance be struck between [indivi-
dual and societal] interests, both substantively and procedurally.”89 Using this ap-
proach, it could conceivably identify principles of fundamental justice that militate
in favour of Parliament’s mandatory minimum sentencing schemes, such as public
safety, to be balanced against the principle of proportionality. It could then recon-
cile the competing principles by concluding that s. 7, like s. 12, only prohibits gross
disproportionality.
In my view, this approach would be a mistake. As we have seen, proportional-
ity is not only a longstanding tenet in our criminal justice system; it is central to
how we justify the institution of criminal punishment in the first place. According
to this foundational principle, disproportionate sentences are, by definition, both
unjust and unjustifiable. In this light, it is hard to see how the Court could treat a
deprivation of liberty resulting from a disproportionate sentence as consistent with
the principles of fundamental justice, even if disproportionality arguably serves
competing societal interests such as public safety (which, I hasten to add, it likely
does not: the empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that harsh mandatory
minimums do not deter crime or enhance public safety).90 A finding that only
Court’s statement in full: “Is there then a principle of fundamental justice embedded in
s. 7 that would give rise to a constitutional remedy against a punishment that does not
infringe s. 12? We do not think so. To find that gross and excessive disproportionality
of punishment is required under s. 12 but a lesser degree of proportionality suffices
under s. 7 would render incoherent the scheme of interconnected ‘legal rights’ set out
in ss. 7 to 14 the Charter by attributing contradictory standards to ss. 12 and 7 in
relation to the same subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would be unacceptable.”
88 Nelles v. Ontario, 1989 CarswellOnt 963, 1989 CarswellOnt 415, 71 C.R. (3d) 358,
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, 196.
89 Cunningham v. Canada, 1993 CarswellOnt 977, 1993 CarswellOnt 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
143 at pp. 151-52, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 492, 20 C.R. (4th) 57. See also R. v. Mills, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 668, 28 C.R. (5th) 207, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 1999 CarswellAlta 1056, 1999
CarswellAlta 1055 at paras. 61–67.
90 See esp. Anthony M. Doob & Cheryl M. Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Ac-
cepting the Null Hypothesis” (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 143 (reviewing existing
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grossly disproportionate sentences are inconsistent with s. 7 would result in a fun-
damental disjuncture between the principles that expressly animate and justify our
criminal sentencing scheme and the principles of fundamental justice. It would
therefore perpetuate the tensions and contradictions in the Court’s jurisprudence
and in Canadian law more generally.
The only remaining option is to revise the s. 12 test so that it accords with the
s. 7 standard by abandoning the gross disproportionality requirement. This option
would require the Court to overturn a well-established legal test. Yet, it is ulti-
mately the most defensible option and indeed the most consistent with the Court’s
recent jurisprudence. In Anderson the Court made clear that the judge is responsible
for ensuring a proportionate sentence. It also stressed that judges must pay heed to
the particularities of Aboriginal offenders when sentencing them as part of the re-
quired proportionality analysis.91 By finding that disproportionate sentences are
contrary to s. 12 of the Charter, the Court would not only reconcile ss. 7 and 12; it
would also empower sentencing judges to discharge their duty to issue proportion-
ate sentences for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders alike. As we have seen,
judges are currently unable to fulfill this duty in some cases due to the operation of
mandatory minimum sentences and prosecutorial discretion. At present, s. 12 offers
no recourse where judges are bound to sentence offenders to disproportionate pen-
alties, contrary to their institutional duties, to foundational sentencing principles, to
the dictates of the Criminal Code, and to the principles of fundamental justice. This
situation is insupportable. The most obvious “out” for the Court, in light of the
Anderson decision, is to alter the s. 12 standard so that it actually reflects the s. 7
proportionality principle.
6. CONCLUSION
Two years ago, Don Stuart made the following prediction: 
There will be clear challenges to the courts to dust off section 12 to put
constitutional brakes on Parliament’s new appetite for enacting minimum
punishments at a time when the United States courts and policy-makers
have become acutely aware of the danger, injustice and costs of such sen-
tencing rigidity.92
criminological studies and concluding that we should conditionally accept the “null
hypothesis,” according to which harsher sentences do not work to deter crime). See
also Berger, supra note 1 at 106-07.
91 Of course, the factors that inform proportionality in the context of Aboriginal sentenc-
ing can and should be considered as part of the current gross disproportionality assess-
ment. They would, however, be more readily protected if judges were empowered to
strike down disproportionate sentences under s. 12. See Ryan Newell, “Making Matters
Worse: The Safe Streets and Communities Act and the Ongoing Crisis of Indigenous
Over-Incarceration,” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199.
92 Stuart, supra note 81 at 37.
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Stuart has already been proven right: s. 12 challenges to mandatory minimums are
coming thick and fast. In recent years, we have seen numerous such challenges,
mostly to mandatory minimums associate with various firearms-related offences.93
Recent decisions have also applied s. 12 to the victim surcharge, which is a
specific, mandatory sentencing provision that is currently giving rise to much con-
troversy and confusion in the lower courts. Section 737 of the Criminal Code states
that an offender who is convicted of an offence (or discharged under s. 730 of the
Criminal Code) “shall pay a victim surcharge, in addition to any other punishment
imposed . . .”94 The surcharge is calculated as 30 percent of any fine or $100 for
every summary conviction and $200 for every indictable conviction. As of 2013,
the victim surcharge is truly mandatory: judges can no longer waive it, even in
cases of undue hardship.95 Although its status as a criminal sentence or punishment
93 Recent cases in which the accused challenged a mandatory minimums sentence for a
firearms-related offence under section 12 of the Charter include: R. v. Hammerstrom,
2014 BCSC 1201, 2014 CarswellBC 1896; R. v. Brown, 2014 CarswellBC 1622, 2014
BCPC 113; R. v. Abdullahi, 2014 CarswellOnt 1805, 2014 ONSC 272 (S.C.J.); R. v.
MacDonald, 2012 NSCA 50, 2012 CarswellNS 328, 317 N.S.R. (2d) 90, 283 C.C.C.
(3d) 308; reversed in part 2014 CSC 3, 2014 SCC 3, 2014 CarswellNS 16, 2014 Car-
swellNS 17, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 113, 7 C.R. (7th) 229 (S.C.C.) (ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, but not on the section 12 issue: R. v. MacDonald, 2014
SCC 3, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37, 2014 CarswellNS 17, 2014 CarswellNS 16, 7 C.R. (7th)
229, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 113; R. v. Vandyke, 2013 ABPC 347, 2013 CarswellAlta 2675; R.
v. Ball, 2013 CarswellBC 3890, 2013 BCSC 2372; R. v. Hailemolokot, 2013 MBQB
285, 2013 CarswellMan 646; Nur, ONCA, supra note 59 (appeal to the Supreme Court
granted: see supra note 9; R. v. Rocheleau, 2013 CarswellOnt 15484, 2013 ONCA 679,
5 C.R. (7th) 397; R. v. Smickle, 2013 ONCA 678, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 371, 5 C.R. (7th)
359, 2013 CarswellOnt 15936; R. v. Charles, 2013 ONCA 681, 2013 CarswellOnt
15470, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 352, 5 C.R. (7th) 370; leave to appeal allowed 2014 Carswell-
Ont 4609, 2014 CarswellOnt 4608 (S.C.C.); R. v. Meszaros, 2013 ONCA 682, 309
C.C.C. (3d) 392, 2013 CarswellOnt 15469, 5 C.R. (7th) 415; R. v. Neault, 2013 SKPC
174, 2013 CarswellSask 753; R. v. McMillan, 2013 MBQB 229, 2013 CarswellMan
556; R. v. Adamo, 2013 MBQB 225, 300 C.C.C. (3d) 515, 2013 CarswellMan 492, 4
C.R. (7th) 326; R. v. Crockwell, 2013 NLTD(G) 23, 2013 CarswellNfld 74; R. v. Sheck,
2013 BCPC 105, 2013 CarswellBC 1196; R. v. Christensen, 2012 BCPC 374, 2012
CarswellBC 3308; and R. v. Cater, 2012 NSPC 37, 2012 CarswellNS 309. Other recent
challenges to mandatory minimum sentences include: R. v. Lloyd, 2014 BCCA 224,
2014 CarswellBC 1688 (s. 12 challenge to a one-year mandatory minimum sentence
for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking); R. v. S. (R.R.G.), 2014 Car-
swellBC 2269, 2014 BCPC 170 (s. 12 challenge to 90-day mandatory minimum sen-
tence for touching a person under the age of 16 years for a sexual purpose); R. v. Sta-
pley, 2014 CarswellOnt 5097, 2014 ONCJ 184 (s. 12 challenge to 90-day mandatory
minimum sentence for child luring by means of a computer); and R. v. Khan, 2013
ONCJ 267, 2013 CarswellOnt 5942 (s. 12 challenge to a 14-day mandatory minimum
sentence for invitation to sexual touching).
94 Criminal Code, supra note 3 at s. 737.
95 The victim surcharge was made truly mandatory by the Increased Offenders’ Account-
ability for Victims Act, S.C. 2013, c. 11. Prior to the act, the surcharge was mandatory
in the sense that it applied in all cases, but the law contemplated that the defendant
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is currently contested,96 the victim surcharge is at the very least akin to a
mandatory minimum sentence — and arguably, it is a quintessential mandatory
minimum sentence. It is imposed on the offender at sentencing. It is mandatory,
meaning it applies without regard to the particular circumstances of the offence or
the offender, including the offender’s ability to pay.97 And, like the mandatory
minimum sentences discussed above, it increases the scope and impact of
prosecutorial discretion while binding the sentencing judge, since the total
surcharge depends in large part on how many charges or counts the prosecutor pur-
sues, and on whether the prosecutor elects to proceed summarily or by indictment.
The mandatory victim surcharge has resulted in significant discrepancies
within trial courts. First, there is disagreement about how the surcharge is to be
applied: some judges use nugatory fines, lengthy payment periods, or other strate-
gies to reduce the surcharge’s impact, thereby giving effect to the principle of pro-
portionality, while others reject these strategies.98 Second, the mandatory surcharge
has been challenged under s. 12 of the Charter as an instance of cruel and unusual
punishment, with lower courts splitting on its constitutionality.99 Third, there is
disagreement about the precedential value of the s. 12 Charter decisions issued by
lower courts, resulting in their uneven application, even within the same court-
houses.100 The result is intolerable from a rule of law perspective: offenders sen-
could be exempted upon request if he or she could show that the imposition of the
surcharge would cause undue hardship. The act eliminated this possibility of exemp-
tion. See Tanya Dupuis, Legislative Summary of Bill C-37: Increasing Offenders’ Ac-
countability to Victims Act (February 27, 2013; revised April 11, 2013), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c37&
Parl=41&Ses=1&source=library_prb&Language=E#a5>.
96 Cf. R. v. Cloud, 2014 QCCQ 464, 2014 CarswellQue 742, 8 C.R. (7th) 364 at para. 22
[“Cloud”], R. c. Chaussé, 2014 QCCQ 5234, 2014 CarswellQue 6779; leave to appeal
allowed 2014 QCCA 1548, 2014 CarswellQue 8437, R. c. Methot, 2014 QCCQ 3833,
2014 CarswellQue 4865;  leave to appeal allowed 2014 QCCA 1377, 2014 Carswell-
Que 7194 and Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Torry, 2014 SKQB 189, 2014 Car-
swellSask 431 [“Torry”]; and see R. v. Michael, 2014 CarswellOnt 10487, 2014 ONCJ
360 at paras. 3–17 [“Michael”].
97 See Cloud, ibid. at para. 22.
98 See esp. Cloud, ibid.
99 Cf. R. v. Flaro, 2014 CarswellOnt 192, 7 C.R. (7th) 151, 2014 ONCJ 2, Michael, supra
note 96, R. c. Larocque, 2014 ONCJ 428, 2014 CarswellOnt 12087 and R. v. Javier, 11
C.R. (7th) 43, 2014 ONCJ 361, 2014 CarswellOnt 10905 (unreported). See also R. v.
Tinker, 2014 ONCJ 208, 2014 CarswellOnt 5589, striking down the surcharge under s.
7 of the Charter after incorporating the gross disproportionality assessment into the s. 7
analysis.
100 See e.g. Andrew Seymour, “Judges divided on constitutionality of victim surcharge”
Ottawa Citizen (August 7, 2014), online: <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-
news/judges-divided-on-constitutionality-of-victims-surcharge>, noting “a growing
split among the city’s [Ottawa’s] judiciary over the constitutionality of the controver-
sial [victim surcharge] law,” which has “created a situation where an offender may or
may not be ordered to pay the surcharge depending on the judge who hears their case.”
See also R. v. Sharkey, 2014 ONCJ 437, 2014 CarswellOnt 11392 (Ont. C.J.).
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tenced in different jurisdictions in Canada — or even in adjacent courtrooms in the
very same courthouse — may or may not be ordered to pay the victim surcharge;
and those who are ordered to pay it may or may not benefit from judicial strategies
designed to remedy disproportionality.101 Moreover, the issue of whether and how
to apply the surcharge arises in every single criminal case resulting in a conviction
or a s. 730 discharge. Thus, despite the Court’s insistence in Ferguson that if a
mandatory minimum sentence contravenes s. 12, it must be struck across the board,
the victim surcharge is applied in a patchwork fashion every single day.102 In these
circumstances, clarification from the Supreme Court of Canada cannot come soon
enough.103
In December, the Court will hear a different Charter challenge to mandatory
minimum sentences in R. v. Nur.104 That case will give it occasion to reconsider
how ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter apply in the mandatory minimum context. Admit-
tedly, the Court’s track record of showing immense deference to Parliament with
respect to sentencing legislation does not bode well for those who hope Nur will
create new remedies for offenders facing disproportionate mandatory minimums.
But perhaps Anderson’s insistence that judges are solely responsible for ensuring
proportionate sentences, and that they are bound to do so, is cause for cautious
optimism.105 If the Court wishes to give real effect to this edict, it will need to give
judges more tools for resisting disproportionate mandatory minimums.
101 In one case, a court granted an application by the Crown for a writ of mandamus order-
ing the sentencing judge to impose the victim surcharge. See Torry, supra note 96.
That a court issued this rather extreme remedy is perhaps unsurprising given the press-
ing need for more clarity and consistency with respect to the surcharge. But unfortu-
nately, the court in question did not have the opportunity to consider a constitutional
challenge to the victim surcharge, nor did it have the opportunity to fully consider the
non-constitutional aspects of the proportionality analysis as applied to the surcharge;
hence, controversies surrounding the surcharge persist, even in the jurisdiction in
question.
102 Supra note 67.
103 This pressing issue could reach the Supreme Court of Canada through the regular ap-
peals process, but this avenue would delay the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue,
possibly for years. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court Act, (R.S.C. 1985, c. 5-
26) contemplates an appeal per saltum on a question of law alone, with leave from the
Court and upon consent of the parties, whereby a case can come before the Supreme
Court directly from a provincial court. A per saltum appeal would be desirable in this
case. Every day that we wait for an authoritative pronouncement on the victim
surcharge, the surcharge is inconsistently applied — or not applied, as the case may
be — to every single person across the country who is convicted of a criminal offence
or granted a discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code, supra note 3. Moreover, it
would be optimal if the Court could hear a joint appeal on the constitutional and non-
constitutional aspects of the victim surcharge so that it could provide a complete an-
swer to the current controversies surrounding that provision without having to wait for
separate appeals.
104 Nur, S.C.C., supra note 8.
105 Sylvestre, supra note 6 at 466: “Justice LeBel [recognizing proportionality as a princi-
ple of fundamental justice in Ipeelee] may very well have provided scholars and crimi-
nal lawyers with the long-awaited way out of the dead end of s. 12 jurisprudence.
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If the Court does choose to relax the s. 12 test for mandatory minimum
sentences, it could do so in two (non-mutually exclusive) ways. First, it could
loosen the standards for the reasonable hypothetical analysis. As we have seen, the
“most innocent offender” application of the reasonable hypothetical analysis could
potentially be used to strike down just about any law under s. 12.106 A return to
Smith-style hypotheticals would thus serve as a wink and a nudge to judges, permit-
ting them to indirectly invalidate disproportionate sentences on the grounds that in
some circumstances, those same sentences would be grossly disproportionate. This
approach would make it easier for judges to discharge their responsibility to ensure
proportionality. Moreover, the Court could adopt it without expressly repudiating
its existing jurisprudence. Yet, this approach would ultimately leave intact the
problematic notion that “merely” disproportionate sentences do not offend s. 12 of
the Charter. As such, it would not actually reconcile ss. 7 and 12 in theory, even
though it would reduce the gap between those Charter provisions in practice. I
think the Court can do better.
The better alternative is to reconceive of s. 12 in light of s. 7 by abandoning
the gross disproportionality requirement altogether. This move would signal a dra-
matic shift towards more judicial intervention in the sentencing sphere. But in my
view, a dramatic change is needed to achieve both Charter consistency and just
criminal sentences. The Court should not shy away from protecting basic constitu-
tional principles like proportionality. If mandatory minimum sentencing schemes
cannot survive the honest application of those principles, then they should not sur-
vive at all.
If the court does nothing, then offenders will continue to have a right to a just,
proportionate sentence without a remedy, contrary to the most basic principles of
our constitutional law. And judges will continue to be bound by an “ought” without
a “can,” contrary to the most basic principles of fairness and logic. Ultimately, the
Court’s approach in Nur and its follow-through on Anderson will reveal which
principle it values more: deference to the legislature and the executive in the realm
of criminal sentencing; or the principle of proportionality that justifies the institu-
tion of criminal sentencing in the first place.
POSTSCRIPT
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that proportionality is a principle of fun-
damental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. The forgoing article identifies four ways
in which this statement can be reconciled with the s. 12 gross disproportionality
standard. Since the article was written, the Court of Appeal for Ontario released R.
Moreover, the recognition of the proportionality principle may give the parties a more
substantial and permanent, as well as less sensitive, basis to challenge mandatory mini-
mum sentences in cases such as R. v. Nur and R. v. Smickle.”
106 Cf. Parkes, supra note 1 at 164 (“Perhaps a more significant change [than altering the
available remedies for s. 12 violations] would be for the Supreme Court to revisit the
narrow approach to reasonable hypotheticals taken in Goltz and Morrisey authorizing
consideration of a whole range of potential scenarios. However, if the high standard of
‘gross disproportionality’ continues to be applied, then such a change does little to
address the fundamentally arbitrary nature of mandatory minimum sentences.”).
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v. Safarzadeh-Markhali,107 in which it applied a fifth, alternative approach to rec-
onciling ss. 7 and 12. The court affirmed that the sentencing principle of propor-
tionality is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter (at paras. 73-
80). It then specified that this principle “governs the sentencing process, while the
standard of gross disproportionality [that applies to s. 12 claims] applies to the re-
sult” (at para. 82, emphasis in the original). Thus, s. 12 addresses sentencing out-
comes and prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences; whereas the s. 7 principle
of proportionality “prevents Parliament from making sentencing contingent on fac-
tors unrelated to the determination of a fit sentence. In this sense, the principle of
proportionality is closely associated with the established principle that a law that
violates life, liberty or security of the person cannot be arbitrary” (at para. 85).
Following the Court of Appeal’s analysis, it would appear that a “merely” dis-
proportionate sentence is constitutional under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, so long
as the process that culminated in that sentence was shaped by appropriate sentenc-
ing factors, per s. 7. In my view, this result is problematic. First, it is difficult to
imagine a sentencing process that is truly governed by the principle of proportion-
ality, but which nevertheless results in a disproportionate sentence. Arguably, a dis-
proportionate sentence is proof positive that the sentencing process itself was some-
how flawed. Second, in any event, the fact that a sentencing process respects the
principle of proportionality is not worth very much if the resultant sentence is none-
theless disproportionate without constitutional consequences. As explained above,
a disproportionate sentence is inherently unjust. This is so, regardless of how that
disproportionate sentence was reached. I therefore maintain that, to give effect to
the principle of proportionality, and to reconcile ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter in a
meaningful way, the Supreme Court must do something that the Court of Appeal
for Ontario is not empowered to do: it must reconsider its own jurisprudence and
must replace the s. 12 gross disproportionality standard with a standard of
disproportionality.
Lastly, during the final phases of this article’s production, new cases relating
to the mandatory victim surcharge have arisen. I have updated the footnotes where
possible to reflect these developments, but I anticipate that more cases are immi-
nent. My hope is that these cases will soon culminate in a final ruling from the
Supreme Court, one that will end the inconsistency, and the attendant unfairness,
that now characterizes the imposition of the victim surcharge across Canada. 
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